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Abstract
We consider the e¢ cient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a
quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent prefer-
ences distinguishing between payo¤ typesand belief typesand report a characteri-
zation of when the e¢ cient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a nite
type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of su¢ cient conditions
for e¢ cient partial implementation in this classical auction setting.
We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed
in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this
setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish
some types in the payo¤ type - belief type language.
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1 Introduction
Before the work of Harsanyi (1967/68) economists used to routinely argue that game theory
could not be applied to economic settings because it required common knowledge of the
environment. Following Harsanyi (1967/68), economists accepted that rich enough type
spacesallowed any possible lack of common knowledge to be incorporated. But very rich type
spaces would be needed and applied work remains highly sensitive to sometimes unexamined
modelling choices about types. Nowhere is this more true than in mechanism design.
Two of us have written a series of papers highlighting the importance of lack of common
knowledge and rich type spaces in mechanism design, now to be collected together in a book
(Bergemann andMorris (2012)). Abreu andMatsushima (1992) showed that types that cannot
be distinguished in this language may always pool in some equilibrium and thus the e¢ cient
allocation can only be fully implemented if it is measurable with respect to statements that
can be expressed in this language.
2 Partial Implementation
There are I agents. Each agent i has a payo¤ type i belonging to a nite set i. Each
agent is monetary valuation of a good depends on the prole of payo¤ types  = (1; : : : ; I)
and is given by a valuation function vi : 1      I ! R+. Agents are assumed to know
their own payo¤ type i but we want to allow for rich beliefs and higher order beliefs. Thus
we assume each agent has a type ti belonging to a nite set Ti, and write bi : Ti ! i for
a function describing an agents payo¤ type and bi : Ti ! (T i) for his belief type. This
decomposition of an agents type into a payo¤ type and a belief type is a natural one in this
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quasi-linear setting. Two of us used this implicit description of interdependent types in our
work on robust mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris (2012)). We will discuss briey
below a sense in which this decomposition can be seen as without loss of generality.
We will focus on the problem of allocating the object to the agent with the highest valu-
ation. Write i () for the agent who values the object the most, i.e., i () 2 argmaxi vi (),
and in this nite type setting, we can assume without loss of generality that i () is uniquely
dened. We are interested in designing a nite mechanism involving monetary transfers which
has an equilibrium where the object is always allocated to the agent who values it the most.
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. In this context,
a direct mechanism consists of a rule specifying monetary transfers to all agents, y : T ! RI .
Now if agents report themselves to be of the type prole t = (t1; : : : ; tI), the object will be
allocated to agent i
b (t), where we write b (t) = b1 (t1) ; : : : ;bI (tI), and each agent i







b (t0i; t i) vi b (ti; t i)+ yi (t0i; t i) bi (t ijti) , (1)
where the indicator function Ii () of agent i is one if i = i
b (t), and zero otherwise. Thus
we say e¢ cient partial implementation is possible if and only if there exists y : T ! RI such
that (1) is satised.
To give a characterization of the incentive compatibility of the e¢ cient social choice func-
tion i, or short, the e¢ cient partial implementation, it is useful to rst identify key properties
of playersincentives to report their payo¤ types for beliefs about otherspayo¤ types. Fix an
agent i and x his beliefs about the payo¤ types of others,  i 2 ( i). Suppose that agent
i expects the object to be allocated according to i based on the truthful reports of other
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agents and his own (true or false) report. By extension of the valuation function vi, we write
Vi (i; 
0
i;  i) for the expected utility gain of agent i from a misreport 
0
i relative to his true
payo¤ type i, so that Vi (i; 
0
i;  i) ,
P
 i
(Ii (0i;  i)  Ii (i;  i)) i ( i) vi (i;  i). Fix a
subset i  i; say that Vi is cyclically monotonic on (i;  i) if, for every sequence of types 















i ;  i





i ;  i

 0.
Now, Theorem 1 in Rochet (1987) shows that there exists yi : i ! R such that Vi (i; i;  i)+
yi (i)  Vi (i; 0i;  i) + yi (0i) for all i; 0i 2 i if and only if Vi is cyclically monotonic on
(i;  i). Thus cyclic monotonicity tells us that - ignoring belief types beyond the induced
beliefs  i over the payo¤ types - it is possible to choose transfers that give an agent an
incentive to report his payo¤ type truthfully. To state this precisely, it will be useful to
introduce the mapping b i :  (T i) ! ( i) which describes the beliefs over payo¤ types
induced by the agentsbelief types, so that b i (i) [ i] , i nt i : b i (t i) =  io for any








i; t i) bi (t ijti) (2)
Now we consider what we can learn about agentsbeliefs and how we can use what we learn.
The classical environment we are considering - with quasi-linear utility and no limited liability
constraints - is well-known to be very permissive in allowing belief extraction. As observed
by dAspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), Myerson (1981) and Cremer and McLean (1985),
it is possible to elicit agentsbeliefs over other types by o¤ering them gambles. Our general
characterization of e¢ cient partial implementation will essentially state that agentsbeliefs
can be elicited for freeand what then matters is whether the set of payo¤ types consistent
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with a given belief type can be distinguished. But this reduces to a cyclic monotonicity
condition. Thus write bi (i) for the set of payo¤ types of player i associated with belief type
i, so that bi (i) = ni 2 ij9ti with bi (ti) = i and bi (ti) = io. Now we have:
Proposition 1 E¢ cient partial implementation is possible if and only if each Vi satises
cyclic monotonicity on
bi (i) ; b i (i) for each i in the range of bi.
Proof. Suppose e¢ cient partial implementation is possible and so (2) holds for some
y : T ! RI . For any agent i, i in the range of bi and i 2 bi (i), write bti (i; i) for any
type ti with bi (ti) = i and bi (ti) = i. Dene yi (i; i) = Pt i yi  bti (i; i) ; t i i (t i).
By (2), Vi

i; i; b i (i) + yi (i; i)  Vi i; 0i; b i (i) + yi (0i; i) for all i; 0i 2 bi (i).
Thus Vi satises cyclic monotonicity on
bi (i) ; b i (i).
Suppose Vi satises cyclic monotonicity on
bi (i) ; b i (i) for each i in the range






b i (i)+yi (0i; i) for all i; 0i 2 bi(i). SincePt i(log i(t i) log 0i(t i))i(t i) >
0 for any 0i 6= i, (2) holds for y : T ! RI given by yi(t) = yi(bi(ti); bi(ti)) +K log bi(ti)[t i]
with su¢ ciently large K.
We note that the present result of partial implementation is stated for the (ex post) e¢ cient
allocation rule i (). But in fact, the above result is more generally valid for every allocation
rule that is measurable with respect to the payo¤ type prole . The only modication arises
with respect to the utility gains Vi () from misreporting the payo¤ type, i to 0i, which have
to be adapted to the specic allocation rule. In fact, a slightly more general version of this
result was reported in Proposition 6.2 of Bergemann and Morris (2003), a working paper
version of Bergemann and Morris (2005), where general allocation problems were considered.
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In any case, the present result gives a sharp characterization of how payo¤ types and belief
types matter for e¢ cient partial implementation. In particular, di¤erences in beliefs about
otherstypes can be extracted for free, even if they are not payo¤ relevant. But once they
are extracted, the non-payo¤ relevant content of the beliefs does not matter. All that matters
is the implied belief over payo¤ types and the cyclic monotonicity condition given by that
implied belief over the payo¤ types and the set of possible payo¤ types who could have had
the original (perhaps payo¤ irrelevant) belief. Classic su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient partial
implementation can now be seen as special cases of the above Proposition:
1. Private Values. Under private values (i.e., vi (i;  i) does not depend on  i), the
condition becomes vacuous as the cyclic monotonicity conditions are satised.
2. Independent Types. If the agentstypes are distributed independently (bi (ti) does not
depend on ti), then necessary and su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient partial implementation
reduce to the cyclic monotonicity conditions on the entire set i of payo¤ types of each agent
i for his xed beliefs over otherspayo¤ types.
3. Linear Independence and Convex Hull. As noted by our discussant, Eric Maskin, for
any set 	i of linearly independent beliefs over otherspayo¤ types, the cyclic monotonicity
conditions on entire i for all beliefs in 	i are su¢ cient for e¢ cient partial implementation if
there is common knowledge that beliefs lie in the convex hull of 	i, which is less demanding
than the notion of ex post equilibrium. In a similar spirit, Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn and
Moldovanu (2011) investigate conditions for local robust incentive compatibility, and their
Lemma 1 establishes necessary monotonicity conditions for partial implementation, using the
above separation of payo¤ types and belief types.
4. Belief Extraction. Following Neeman (2004), say that beliefs determine preferences
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(BDP) if for every i 2 (T i), there exists at most one i 2 i such that bi (ti) = i
and bi (ti) = i for some ti 2 Ti. Under BDP, the cyclic monotonicity requirements of the
proposition become vacuous.1
5. Ex Post Incentive Compatibility. As in the work of Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000), suppose that a single crossing condition is satised with respect to the
(ordered) payo¤ types of the agents, so that each vi is strictly monotonic in i and 
0
i > i )
vi (
0
i;  i)  vi (i;  i) > vj (0i;  i)  vj (i;  i) for all i; j with i 6= j. Then Vi satises cyclic
monotonicity on (i;  i) for every  i (which implies ex post incentive compatibility) and thus
again it can be shown that the cyclic monotonicity requirements of the proposition hold.2
6. Combining Belief Extraction and Private Values. McLean and Postlewaite (2004) an-
alyze e¢ cient auctions with interdependent values and multidimensional types. More pre-






, with an idiosyncratic
and a common component, ii and 
c
i respectively, as reected by the valuation function







c). The common part of the valuation, vci (
c), depends on the en-
tire prole of common components c = (c1; : : : ; 
c
I). Now, in terms of our language, their
environment in Section 4 can be described by a type space Ti = i, the payo¤ types can be de-
scribed by the identity mapping bi, and the belief types can be described by i [i](j)j 6=i =
1Arguments going back at least to Cremer and McLean (1985) say BDP holds generically on nite type
spaces, since if we x a nite set of types and perturb beliefs, then they will all be di¤erent and BDP will hold.
Recent contributions, notably Heifetz and Neeman (2006) and Chen and Xiong (2011), examine when BDP
holds on innite type spaces, and in particular if it can be said to hold genericallyon innite type spaces.
2Such su¢ cient conditions do not naturally arise in multidimensional payo¤ type space i, expect for some
















. Finally, their condition of positive informational variability im-
plies that the common component ci can be extracted from every agent i, and the residual
private information ii is independent and pertains to the private value, and hence again, our
necessary and su¢ cient conditions are satised.
3 Interdependent Types and Full Implementation
Importantly, Proposition 1 only establishes partial implementation, i.e. that the e¢ cient
allocation arises in some equilibrium but there may exist other equilibria with ine¢ cient
allocations. Suppose there are three agents, I = 3, and each agent has two possible types,
1 = 2 = 3 = f0; 1g. Each agents valuation of the object is given by






Each agent has only two types, and thus a single belief type for each payo¤ type. Suppose,
in particular, that if a type has valuation i, he assigns independent probability 18 to each of
the other agents having valuation j = i, and the remaining probability 78 to j = 1  i.
E¢ cient partial implementation is possible in this example (by both a belief extraction
argument, i.e., su¢ cient condition 3 above, or an ex post incentive compatibility argument,
e.g., su¢ cient condition 4 above). But observe that each type of each agent has an expected
value of 7
6
for the object. To see why, note that if agent 1 say has 1 = 1, his expectation of 2













. But if agent 1 has 1 = 0,














Thus, there will always be an equilibrium where both types of each player behave the same,
which cannot give rise to the e¢ cient allocation, as shown in a general payo¤ environment in
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Bergemann and Morris (2009).
Following Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), we propose a natural description of
agentstypes in this setting. An agents (unconditional) willingness to pay for the object does
not depend on other agentstypes and thus has a natural meaning. If it makes sense to speak
of all agentswillingness to pay for the object, it makes sense to talk about an agents beliefs
about other agentswillingness to pay for the object, and his willingness to pay conditional on
otherswillingness to pay for the object. Call the agents unconditional willingness to pay his
rst order type. Call his beliefs over otherswillingness to pay and conditional willingness to
pay his second order type. Now we can inductively dene an agents (n+ 1)th order type to
be his beliefs over othersnth order types and his willingness to pay conditional on othersnth
order types. We can thus identify an agent with a hierarchy of statements about preferences
and conditional preferences.
In the simple setting of this note, such hierarchies can be dened formally as follows. An
nth level type is pair tn = (bn; vn) consisting of a belief component and valuation component.
Write Tn for the set of nth level types that can arise in a nite type space. We describe the
sets Tn inductively. Let T1 = f?g  R+ with a typical 1st level type t1 = (?; v1) consisting
of a degenerate belief type and an unconditional valuation of the object. Now an (n+ 1)th
level type tn+1 = (bn+1; vn+1) consists of a simple (i.e., nite support) probability distribution
bn+1 2 (Tn) with support supp(bn+1) and a valuation function vn+1 : supp(bn+1)! R+. Now
a hierarchy of types is a sequence of nth order types (t1; t2; : : : ; tn; : : :) 2 T1T2  Tn   .
A sequence of types is coherent if each (n+ 1)th type tn+1 induces beliefs over other agents
(n  1)th level types and willingness to pay conditional on other agents(n  1)th level types
that are consistent with those of tn. (We omit the formal statement of this condition). Now if
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we write T f for the set of all coherent hierarchies of higher order types that can arise in nite
type spaces, we have a natural language in which to discuss agentstypes.
In Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), we discuss the extension to innite types
and construct a universal space of higher order preferences T  from hierarchies. We can
identify those hierarchies with beliefs over otherstypes and valuations conditional on their
hierarchies. Thus we identify a type t 2 T  with a probability measure over the types of




and an equivalence class of b-integrable valuation functions v :
(T )I 1 ! R (where we identify two functions if they agree b-almost surely). In this sense,
we have a canonical way of representing type spaces with a decomposition of types into payo¤
types and belief types, as we did earlier. However, it is important to realize that these
payo¤ types does not specify valuations on 0-probability events.
This language is closely related to full implementation. Abreu and Matsushima (1992)
showed that a necessary condition for Bayesian full implementation of a social choice function
using a nite mechanism on a nite type space was that two types which had the same hierar-
chies of preferences received the same allocation. While they expressed this measurability
condition as a property of the xed nite type space, it can be expressed without reference
to a particular nite type space as we described above. Thus, if full implementation is re-
quired, we can at most achieve constrained e¢ ciency, with the object allocated to the agent
i (t1; : : : ; t











i ] denotes the payo¤ type component of t

i ,
and Proposition 1 must hold on the coarser type space where types with the same hierarchy
of preferences are merged.
Exact full implementation is generally not possible in the allocation of a single good: even
with private values, while bidding ones true value is a dominant strategy, it is often only a
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weak best response and it is easy to construct ine¢ cient equilibria in dominated strategies.
For su¢ cient conditions for full implementation with nite mechanisms, the objective must
be weakened to virtual implementation, so that i (t1; : : : ; t

I) is allocated the object with
arbitrarily high probability. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed that virtual Bayesian full
implementation is possible under Bayesian incentive compatibility and their measurability
condition. In this context, this implies that constrained e¢ cient allocation of the good is
possible if the condition of Proposition 1 holds on the coarsened type space that is expressible
in our language.3
3In Bergemann and Morris (2009), we examined the e¢ cient allocation rule (with the single unit auction as
a special case) and gave conditions under which full implementation can be achieved by a simpler mechanism,
namely the direct mechanism, than the mechanism of Abreu and Matsushima (1992). It is an open question
when a simpler mechanism can achieve full implemetation more generally.
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